

Supplementary Material

Do Ukrainians Still Prefer Self-Defense Against Russia At Any Cost?

Janina Dill*

Marnie Howlett[†]

Carl Müller-Crepon[‡]

October 31, 2025

*Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. Corresponding author: janina.dill@bsg.ox.ac.uk.

[†]Oxford School of Global and Area Studies and Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford

[‡]Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Table of Contents

A	Hypotheses:	A2
A.1	Heterogeneous Effects:	A2
B	Sampling and Summary Statistics	A5
B.1	Sampling	A5
B.2	Summary Statistics	A7
C	Additional Results	A11
D	Proportionality: Additional Results	A14
D.1	Forced Choice Outcomes	A14
D.2	Scoring Outcomes	A15
E	Categorical Resistance: Additional Results	A18
F	Robustness Checks of Main Analysis	A19
G	Heterogeneous Effects	A23
G.1	Summary	A23
G.2	By Internal Migration / IDP Status	A26
G.3	By Language and Ethnicity	A27
G.4	By Respondents' Affectedness	A33
G.5	By Respondents' Political Attitudes	A38
H	Within-Location Change in AMCEs	A39
I	Attribute Ranking and Categorical Resistance	A43
J	References (Appendix)	A44

A Hypotheses:

With the exception of H7a and H7b, the hypotheses that emerge from the above reasoning are the same as those of the original study (Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon 2024).

H1: Upfront territorial concessions have a negative effect on support for a strategy.

H2: A higher civilian death toll has a negative effect on support for a strategy.

H3: A higher military death toll has a negative effect on support for a strategy.

H4: A higher likelihood of a nuclear strike on Ukraine has a negative effect on support for a strategy.

H5: The outcome ceasefire/Russian-controlled government has a negative effect; the outcome of withdrawal/sovereignty has a positive effect (compared to withdrawal/neutrality) on support for a strategy.

H6a (proportionality – political autonomy): The more political autonomy the projected outcome affords (ceasefire/Russian-controlled government < withdrawal/neutrality < withdrawal/sovereignty) the weaker the negative effects of the three cost attributes on support for a strategy.

H6b (proportionality – territorial integrity): The more territorial integrity the projected outcome affords (conceding Crimea + Donetsk/Luhansk < conceding only Crimea < no concessions) the weaker the negative effects of the three cost attributes on support for a strategy

H7a (categorical resistance – political autonomy): The negative effects of the three cost attributes increase in size if strategies in a pair do not differ in the level of political autonomy they afford.

H7b (categorical resistance – territorial integrity): The negative effects of the three cost attributes increase in size if strategies in a pair do not differ in the level of territorial integrity they afford.

A.1 Heterogeneous Effects:

H8a (affectedness and cost-sensitivity): The cost attributes have larger effects among more affected respondents.

H8b (affectedness and cost-sensitivity): More affected respondents are less likely to adopt a categorical stance.

H9a (affectedness and cost-insensitivity): The cost attributes have smaller effects

among more affected respondents.

H9b (affectedness and in cost-sensitivity): More affected respondents are more likely to adopt a categorical stance.

Table A1: Experiment 1: Attribute Levels

Attribute	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
1. Upfront concessions	No concessions	Recognize Crimea as part of Russia	Recognize Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of Russia
2. Projected number of civilian casualties in the next 3 months	Approximately 6,000 (About half of the total number of people killed in the first three months of the full-scale war)	Approximately 12,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed in the first three months of the full-scale war)	Approximately 24,000 (About twice the total number of people killed in the first three months of the full-scale war)
3. Projected number of military casualties in the next 3 months (Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard and Police, SSU Security Services of Ukraine, Territorial Defense, and volunteer battalions)	Approximately 6,000 (About half of the total number of people killed in the first three months of the full-scale war)	Approximately 12,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed in the first three months of the full-scale war)	Approximately 24,000 (About twice the total number of people killed in the first three months of the full-scale war)
4. Likelihood of a nuclear strike on Ukraine by Russia	None (0%)	Low (Approximately 5%)	Moderate (Approximately 10%)
5. Likely outcome after 3 months	Withdrawal of Russian troops and preservation of sovereignty (includes possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)	Withdrawal of Russian troops and negotiated neutral status of Ukraine (no possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)	A ceasefire and a Russian-controlled government in Kyiv

Table A2: Experiment 2: Attribute Levels

Attribute	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
1. Upfront concessions	No concessions	Recognize Crimea as part of Russia	Recognize Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of Russia
2. Projected number of civilian casualties (killed) in the next year	Approximately 6,000 (About half of the total number of people killed since the full-scale invasion)	Approximately 12,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed since the full-scale invasion)	Approximately 24,000 (About twice the total number of people killed since the full-scale invasion)
3. Projected number of military casualties (killed) in the next year (Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard and Police, SSU Security Services of Ukraine, Territorial Defense, and volunteer battalions)	Approximately 40,000 (About half of the total number of people killed since the full-scale invasion)	Approximately 80,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed since the full-scale invasion)	Approximately 160,000 (About twice the total number of people killed since the full-scale invasion)
4. Likelihood of a nuclear strike on Ukraine by Russia	Low (Approximately 5%)	Moderate (Approximately 15%)	High (Approximately 45%)
5. Likely outcome after 3 months	Withdrawal of Russian troops and preservation of sovereignty (includes possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)	Withdrawal of Russian troops and negotiated neutral status of Ukraine (no possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)	A ceasefire and a Russian-controlled government in Kyiv

B Sampling and Summary Statistics

B.1 Sampling

The sample was stratified by oblasti,¹ within which PSUs were sampled based on their population size and stratified by their rural and urban status. We revisited 98 percent of the PSUs sampled in 2022 (Sample A) and drew a largely overlapping set of PSUs that was representative of the larger set of regions covered by our replication (Sample B). Within each PSU, one chain for each experiment was sampled with demographic quotas to yield a representative sample.² Given the growing number of displaced persons since Russia's 2022 invasion, we included IDPs in the replication, unlike DHM. Of the contacted, quota-eligible individuals, 41 percent completed the survey.

First, we stratified our sample by oblasti proportionally to the last available electoral statistics from 2019 as well as data on population movements constructed by from 10 telephone surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology since the beginning of the war. We excluded Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasti and Crimea from the sample. Second, within each oblast, we stratified by urban/rural PSUs (voting precincts), allocating a total of 128 PSUs. Third, within each stratum, PSUs were selected randomly with a probability proportional to their size. We made use of the full (random) sample of PSUs already sampled in 2022 (Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon 2024), of which we were able to revisit 114 out of 116 PSUs,³ henceforth called the "DHM sample". While the DHM sample is useful for replication purposes, it is not necessarily representative of the 2024 population. We thus added an additional 14 PSUs to construct a sample designed to be representative of the population in 2024, in particular to cover previously unsurveyed Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasti. This produced our "main sample" with 125 PSUs.⁴ Figure A1a shows the location of PSUs in relation to the incidence of violent attacks by Russia since the beginning of the full-scale war in Figure A1b.


Fourth, within each selected PSU, we interviewed along two chains – one for each experimental design – with 10 respondents each. For each chain, we interviewed respondents starting at a randomized address. Only 1 respondent was surveyed per household if they met the required quota. Of the 6,306 individuals who were present in their household and met the quota, 44 percent refused to be interviewed, 4 percent were excluded due to physical, mental, or language problems, and 11 percent started but interrupted the interview. 41 percent or a total of 2,580 of all contacted, quota-meeting individuals completed the survey.

¹We excluded Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasti and Crimea from the sample.


²Notably, underlying pre-war statistics have been updated based on telephone surveys.

³Two PSUs in Dnipropetrovsk had to be dropped due to safety concerns and the consequences of the destruction of the Kakhovka dam.

⁴3 PSUs are in the DHM sample but not the main sample.



(a) 128 sampled locations, + denotes the DHM sample; × denotes the main sample
 Note: Included oblasti in grey. PSUs plotted with random displacement by up to .2 degrees in every direction.



(b) Conflict events (battles, remote violence, and one-sided violence) by the Russian Armed Forces and its allies, February 2022 to December 2024.
 Note: Data from [Raleigh et al. \(2010\)](#).

Figure A1: Primary sampling units and conflict events

B.2 Summary Statistics

Overall, we sampled more women (55 percent) than men due to Ukraine’s ongoing sex-specific conscription laws. The respondents for Experiments I and II were virtually identical in their demographic composition. Compared to 2022, the respondents in the DHM sample were slightly more educated (37 versus 33 percent had higher education) and less likely to have children (69 versus 73 percent).

The main differed slightly from the DHM sample as it covered additional eastern PSUs, thus containing more Russian-speaking respondents – 25 versus 21 percent of the interviews were conducted in Russian. Importantly, our respondents self-identified as ethnic Russians (≈ 4 percent) or have Russian as their mother-tongue (≈ 14 percent) as frequently as those in DHM. This highlights that any undercoverage of ethnic Russians ([Rickard et al. 2025](#)) has not increased over time. However, in line with other work showing a decrease in Russian language use in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion ([Harding 2023](#); [Kulyk 2024](#)), respondents in the 2024/2025 DHM sample were 9 percentage points less likely to conduct the interview in Russian than in 2022 (21 versus 30 percent).

Table A3: Respondent-level summary statistics: Demographics

Statistic	N	Mean
Gender		
Male	1138	0.45
Female	1382	0.55
Age		
18-29	422	0.17
30-39	454	0.18
40-49	533	0.21
50-59	419	0.17
60+	692	0.27
Children		
No	781	0.31
Yes	1739	0.69
Education		
Complete general secondary education	380	0.15
Vocational and technical education	389	0.15
Secondary special education	748	0.30
Higher Education	941	0.37
Basic general secondary education (up to grade 9 or below)	62	0.02
Econ. depriv.		
no	1140	0.46
yes	1361	0.54
Rural Urban		
Rural	1209	0.48
Urban	1311	0.52
Interview language		
Ukrainian	1889	0.75
Russian	631	0.25
Native language		
Other	78	0.03
Russian	353	0.14
Ukrainian	2041	0.83
Ethnic identity		
Other	55	0.02
Russian	107	0.04
Ukrainian	2354	0.94

Table A4: Respondent-level summary statistics: Affectedness

Statistic	N	Mean
Affectedness score		
low	875	0.35
medium	784	0.32
high	815	0.33
East vs. West		
East	951	0.38
West	1569	0.62
Oblast first attacked		
No	1228	0.49
Yes	1292	0.51
Self war-affected		
no	1245	0.50
yes	1249	0.50
Family war-affected		
no	762	0.31
yes	1731	0.69
Any oneside violence		
no	1996	0.79
yes	524	0.21
Any battles		
no	1772	0.70
yes	748	0.30
Any shelling		
no	947	0.38
yes	1573	0.62

Table A5: Respondent-level summary statistics: Political attitudes

Statistic	N	Mean
Ukr. nation at stake		
no	1138	0.49
yes	1186	0.51
Importance of victory		
All other	504	0.20
Extremely important	2016	0.80
Trust in president		
high	1218	0.52
low	1119	0.48




Figure A2: Demographic comparison between the DHM sample and the main sample as well as between Experiments all experiments

C Additional Results




Figure A3: AMCEs and Marginal Means for forced choice outcome: Original results (July 2022) and Experiments I and II, DHM sample

Note: Coefficients from July 2022 (red) coincide with Figures 2 and 3 in [Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon \(2024\)](#).




Figure A4: AMCEs and Marginal Means for strategy scores: Original results (July 2022) and Experiments I and II, DHM sample

Note: Coefficients from July 2022 (red) coincide with Figures 2 and 3 in [Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon \(2024\)](#).




Figure A5: AMCEs and Marginal Means for strategy scores: Original results (July 2022) and Experiments I and II, main sample

Note: Coefficients from July 2022 (red) coincide with Figures 2 and 3 in [Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon \(2024\)](#).

D Proportionality: Additional Results

D.1 Forced Choice Outcomes




Figure A6: Experiment I, Forced Choice – No evidence for proportionality: Stable effects of cost attributes 2-4 across levels of territorial integrity and political autonomy.

Note: Using main sample




Figure A7: Experiment II, Forced Choice – No evidence for proportionality: Stable effects of cost attributes 2-4 across levels of territorial integrity and political autonomy.

Note: Using main sample




Figure A8: Conditional linear attribute effects on forced choices, by attributes 1 and 5 (see column title), pooling Experiments I and II.

D.2 Scoring Outcomes




Figure A9: Experiment I, Scores – No evidence for proportionality: Stable effects of cost attributes 2-4 across levels of territorial integrity and political autonomy.

Note: Using main sample




Figure A10: Experiment II, Scores – No evidence for proportionality: Stable effects of cost attributes 2-4 across levels of territorial integrity and political autonomy.

Note: Using main sample




Figure A11: Conditional linear attribute effects on `scores`, by attributes 1 and 5 (see column title), pooling Experiments I and II.

E Categorical Resistance: Additional Results




Figure A12: Experiment I: Effects of cost attributes 2-4 with and without pair-level variation in territorial integrity and political autonomy attributes.

Note: Using main sample.




Figure A13: Experiment II: Effects of cost attributes 2-4 with and without pair-level variation in territorial integrity and political autonomy attributes.

Note: Using main sample.

F Robustness Checks of Main Analysis

For completeness, we conduct the same robustness checks as [Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon \(2024\)](#) using the main sample and pooling Experiments I and II, all reported in Appendix F. Changing our estimation method to estimating Average Feature Choice Probabilities ([Abramson et al. 2020](#)), modeling attribute levels linearly, or using logistic regressions does not change the main results. Similarly, weighting observations by the size of their household to correct for the likely over-sampling of smaller households and changing the clustering of standard errors does not affect our results. Lastly, and in difference to [Dill, Howlett and Müller-Crepon \(2024\)](#), we do find some evidence of order effects among the cost attributes for which we randomized the order in which they are shown to respondents. Cost attributes that are shown higher up appear to have slightly larger effects than those shown in lower positions.




Figure A14: Average feature choice probabilities ([Abramson et al. 2020](#))




Figure A15: AMCEs using weights proportional to the size of households




Figure A16: Average linear attribute effects, taking each attribute as a linear scale




Figure A17: AMCEs on choice outcome using logistic regression models




Figure A18: Clustering standard errors not at all, on the level of pairs, respondents, and PSUs.




Figure A19: Order Effects

G Heterogeneous Effects

G.1 Summary

Table A6: Pooled Experiments I and II: Omnibus Wald-test result for joint nullity of heterogenous effects by moderator

Moderator	Score (0-1)			Forced choice (0/1)		
	F-Stat	<i>p</i>	Adj. <i>p</i>	F-Stat	<i>p</i>	Adj. <i>p</i>
Demographics						
Gender	0.78	0.65	1	2.28	0.01	0.49
Internal migrant	1.69	0.08	1	0.68	0.74	1
Age (5 groups)	1.19	0.19	1	1.37	0.06	1
Children: yes/no	2.75	0.002	0.09	2.25	0.01	0.54
Level of education	1.10	0.30	1	0.92	0.62	1
Economic deprivation	2.12	0.02	0.83	0.92	0.52	1
Rural / Urban	0.89	0.54	1	0.88	0.55	1
Interview language	8.72	0	0	8.64	0	0
Native language	4.54	0	0	3.85	0	0.0000
Ethnic identity	2.07	0.003	0.14	1.90	0.01	0.38
Affectedness						
Affectedness score	4.28	0	0.0000	3.67	0.0000	0.0000
East vs. West	5.63	0.0000	0.0000	5.05	0.0000	0.0000
Oblast first attacked	7.50	0	0	5.77	0	0.0000
Self war-affected	0.91	0.52	1	1.19	0.29	1
Family war-affected	1.88	0.04	1	1.79	0.06	1
Any one-sided violence	3.19	0.0004	0.02	2.32	0.01	0.43
Any battles	4.37	0.0000	0.0002	3.95	0.0000	0.001
Any shelling	6.25	0	0.0000	1.61	0.10	1
Attitudes						
Importance of victory	10.71	0	0	7.76	0	0
Survival of nation at stake	3.59	0.0001	0.004	1.10	0.36	1
Trust in president	4.43	0.0000	0.0001	6.68	0	0

Note: Adjusted p-values based on a Bonferroni adjustment for 42 hypotheses.

Table A7: Experiment 2024-12.1: Omnibus Wald-test result for joint nullity of heterogeneous effects by moderator

Moderator	Score (0-1)			Forced choice (0/1)		
	F-Stat	<i>p</i>	Adj. <i>p</i>	F-Stat	<i>p</i>	Adj. <i>p</i>
Demographics						
Gender	0.72	0.71	1	2.22	0.01	0.60
Internal migrant	0.64	0.78	1	1.54	0.12	1
Age (5 groups)	0.90	0.65	1	1.34	0.07	1
Children: yes/no	1.82	0.05	1	1.91	0.04	1
Level of education	1.65	0.01	0.27	0.70	0.92	1
Economic deprivation	1.93	0.04	1	0.62	0.80	1
Rural / Urban	1.08	0.37	1	0.68	0.74	1
Interview language	6.04	0	0.0000	4.53	0.0000	0.0001
Native language	3.63	0.0000	0.0000	3.77	0.0000	0.0000
Ethnic identity	2.50	0.0002	0.01	3.69	0.0000	0.0000
Affectedness						
Affectedness score	3.81	0.0000	0.0000	2.87	0.0000	0.001
East vs. West	2.93	0.001	0.05	2.30	0.01	0.45
Oblast first attacked	6.35	0	0.0000	4.02	0.0000	0.001
Self war-affected	0.43	0.93	1	1.10	0.36	1
Family war-affected	0.85	0.58	1	1.82	0.05	1
Any one-sided violence	2.91	0.001	0.05	2.12	0.02	0.83
Any battles	5.00	0.0000	0.0000	3.51	0.0001	0.01
Any shelling	5.02	0.0000	0.0000	1.61	0.10	1
Attitudes						
Importance of victory	4.84	0.0000	0.0000	4.54	0.0000	0.0001
Survival of nation at stake	3.11	0.001	0.02	1.82	0.05	1
Trust in president	2.13	0.02	0.82	3.88	0.0000	0.001

Note: Adjusted p-values based on a Bonferroni adjustment for 42 hypotheses.

Table A8: Experiment 2024-12.2: Omnibus Wald-test result for joint nullity of heterogeneous effects by moderator

Moderator	Score (0-1)			Forced choice (0/1)		
	F-Stat	<i>p</i>	Adj. <i>p</i>	F-Stat	<i>p</i>	Adj. <i>p</i>
Demographics						
Gender	0.68	0.75	1	1.03	0.41	1
Internal migrant	2.88	0.001	0.06	0.73	0.70	1
Age (5 groups)	1.06	0.36	1	0.79	0.82	1
Children: yes/no	1.85	0.05	1	1.37	0.19	1
Level of education	0.68	0.94	1	1.18	0.20	1
Economic deprivation	1.56	0.11	1	0.87	0.56	1
Rural / Urban	0.94	0.49	1	1.31	0.22	1
Interview language	3.19	0.0004	0.02	5.19	0.0000	0.0000
Native language	2.60	0.0001	0.005	1.92	0.01	0.33
Ethnic identity	1.50	0.07	1	1.80	0.02	0.67
Affectedness						
Affectedness score	1.70	0.03	1	1.88	0.01	0.43
East vs. West	3.13	0.001	0.02	4.06	0.0000	0.001
Oblast first attacked	2.10	0.02	0.89	2.67	0.003	0.12
Self war-affected	1.30	0.22	1	1.92	0.04	1
Family war-affected	1.93	0.04	1	0.80	0.63	1
Any one-sided violence	1.53	0.12	1	1.04	0.41	1
Any battles	1.67	0.08	1	1.75	0.06	1
Any shelling	2.06	0.02	1	0.86	0.57	1
Attitudes						
Importance of victory	7.41	0	0	4.18	0.0000	0.0003
Survival of nation at stake	2.16	0.02	0.72	1.80	0.06	1
Trust in president	3.14	0.001	0.02	3.75	0.0000	0.002

Note: Adjusted p-values based on a Bonferroni adjustment for 42 hypotheses.

G.2 By Internal Migration / IDP Status




Figure A20: Pooled Experiments I and II: Moved since February 2022

G.3 By Language and Ethnicity




Figure A21: Pooled Experiments I and II: Interview language




Figure A22: Pooled Experiments I and II: AMCIEs of conducting the interview in Russian (compared to Ukrainian) among respondents in the same PSU

Note: Estimated by adding a adding “fixed slopes” for every attribute level in every PSU.




Figure A23: Pooled Experiments I and II: Respondent ethnicity




Figure A24: Pooled Experiments I and II: AMCIEs of non-Ukrainian ethnic self-identifications (compared to Ukrainian) among respondents in the same PSU

Note: Estimated by adding a adding “fixed slopes” for every attribute level in every PSU.




Figure A25: Pooled Experiments I and II: Respondent native language




Figure A26: Pooled Experiments I and II: AMCIEs of non-Ukrainian mother-tongues (compared to Ukrainian) among respondents in the same PSU

Note: Estimated by adding a adding “fixed slopes” for every attribute level in every PSU.

G.4 By Respondents' Affectedness




Figure A27: Pooled Experiments I and II: Affectedness score




Figure A28: Pooled Experiments I and II: East vs West




Figure A29: Pooled Experiments I and II: AMCIEs of the East (compared to the West) among respondents with the same mother-tongue

Note: Estimated by adding a adding “fixed slopes” for every attribute level in every mother tongue.




Figure A30: Pooled Experiments I and II: Oblast directly invaded by Russian forces




Figure A31: Pooled Experiments I and II: AMCIEs of living in an oblast directly invaded by Russian forces among respondents with the same mother-tongue
 Note: Estimated by adding a adding “fixed slopes” for every attribute level in every mother tongue.

G.5 By Respondents' Political Attitudes




Figure A32: Pooled Experiments I and II: By importance of victory




Figure A33: Pooled Experiments I and II: By trust in president

H Within-Location Change in AMCEs

As preregistered, we assess whether greater local exposure to the war correlates with changes in AMCEs *within* locations since 2022. This would be consistent with findings by [Bartusevičius et al. \(2023\)](#) who reported from a survey in spring 2022 that respondents' resistance to Russia increases with exposure to the war. To study this question, we account for fixed location- and experiment-level attribute effects, thus only capturing changes in AMCEs that are due to changes in locations' characteristics over time. Reported in Appendix H, we do not find that locations' (1) exposure to shelling, and greater changes in their respondents' (2) reported affect- edness or (3) that of their family members is systematically correlated with greater positive or negative changes in AMCEs.⁵ To avoid false positive findings, we refrain from interpreting marginally significant changes that are not consistently es- timated across outcomes and measures of exposure to violence.

This analysis comes with a number of important caveats that preclude a clear conclusion of the effect of exposure to violence on responses in our experiment.

⁵Diverging from the pre-registration, we do not assess the correlation of changes in AMCEs with PSU-level occupation by Russian forces since only 3 PSUs were occupied at any point since February 2022.

Clearly, using repeated cross-sections from the same locations is fraught with more inferential problems than using individual-level panel data. In particular, our samples in 2022 and 2024/2025 differed slightly in their composition. Respondents might also have moved in or out of the locations in which we sample, often as a result of the violence brought on by the war. Lastly, the exposure to violence at the local level might have been caused by some factors which themselves could affect attitudes toward the war, for instance, changes in the strategic value of a settlement.




Figure A34: Association of close-by shelling events (0/1) over the past 24 months before December 2024 and within location changes in AMCEs

Note: Pooling Experiments 0, I, and III. Estimated by adding a adding “fixed slopes” for every attribute level in every PSU and experiment.




Figure A35: Association of changes in respondents' average affectedness and within location changes in AMCEs

Note: Pooling Experiments 0, I, and II. Estimated by adding a adding "fixed slopes" for every attribute level in every PSU and experiment.




Figure A36: Association of changes in the average affectedness of respondents' family members and within location changes in AMCEs

Note: Pooling Experiments 0, I, and II. Estimated by adding a adding "fixed slopes" for every attribute level in every PSU and experiment.

I Attribute Ranking and Categorical Resistance



Figure A37: Within-Rank Marginal Means, all experiments

J References (Appendix)

- Abramson, Scott F, Korhan Kocak, Asya Magazinnik and Anton Strezhnev. 2020. "Improving preference elicitation in conjoint designs using machine learning for heterogeneous effects." *Unpublished Working Paper* .
- Bartusevičius, Henrikas, Florian Van Leeuwen, Honorata Mazepus, Lasse Laustsen and Andreas Forø Tollefsen. 2023. "Russia's attacks on civilians strengthen Ukrainian resistance." *PNAS nexus* 2(12):pgad386.
- Dill, Janina, Marnie Howlett and Carl Müller-Crepon. 2024. "At Any Cost: How Ukrainians Think about Self-Defense Against Russia." *American Journal of Political Science* 68(4):1460–1478.
- Harding, Luke. 2023. "A generational shift': war prompts Ukrainians to embrace their language." *The Guardian*.
- Kulyk, Volodymyr. 2024. "National Identity in Time of War: Ukraine after the Russian Aggressions of 2014 and 2022." *Problems of Post-Communism* 71(4):296–308.
- Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen. 2010. "Introducing ACLED: an armed conflict location and event dataset: special data feature." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5):651–660.
- Rickard, Kit, Gerard Toal, Kristin M Bakke and John O'Loughlin. 2025. "The challenges of surveying in war zones: Lessons from Ukraine." *Journal of Peace Research* p. 00223433251321763.